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ABSTRACT—In response to Twitter’s decision to label one of the President’s 
tweets misleading, the Trump White House issued an executive order to limit 
the scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act via agency 
rulemaking. In the Order, Trump calls for the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to “interpret” Section 230 in a manner that curtails 
websites’ ability to remove and restrict user speech. This Essay analyzes the 
Order and concludes that the President’s effort to limit Section 230 will fail. 
First, the FCC does not have rulemaking authority to issue the proposed 
rules. Second, the proposed rules cannot be issued because they are 
inconsistent with the statute. Finally, this Essay will discuss the policy 
implications of the proposed rules and argue that they would lead to less 
speech and engagement on the Internet, not more of it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It was years in the making, but on May 26, 2020, Twitter finally1 took 
action on the account of @realDonaldTrump.2 As content moderation goes, 
the action was fairly modest. Twitter appended the following to a tweet 
making misleading claims about mail-in voting: “Get the facts about mail-in 
ballots”3 and a link to accurate voting information.4 The President’s response 
was swift and retributive. Within hours, he tweeted that Twitter is “now 
interfering in the 2020 Presidential Election” and “completely stifling FREE 
 
 1 Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s Decision to Label Trump’s Tweets Was Two Years in the Making, 
WASH. POST (May 29, 2020, 6:55 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/29/inside-
twitter-trump-label/ [https://perma.cc/6FWD-HR5D]. 
 2 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2020). 
 3 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 7:17 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1265255845358645254 [https://perma.cc/9DRW-2L7N]. 
 4 See Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter Fraud, TWITTER 
(May 26, 2020), https://twitter.com/i/events/1265330601034256384 [https://perma.cc/NC44-2P9B]. 
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SPEECH.”5 And within two days, he signed Executive Order 13,925, titled 
“Preventing Online Censorship,”6 a proclamation that seeks to punish large 
social media platforms that have the temerity to fact-check the President.7 
The Executive Order represents an effort to undermine the immunity 
that platforms like Twitter and Facebook enjoy under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) when it comes to moderating user 
content8—Section 230 grants broad immunity to websites with respect to 
decisions they make about publishing and removing user content.9 The 
Executive Order directs the Commerce Department to file a rulemaking 
petition before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “clarify” 
the existing immunity, by which the Order really means to rewrite the statute 
in the guise of making it clearer.10 
As explained in this Essay, this convoluted attempt to bypass Congress 
will not succeed. Yet, it would be a mistake to ignore the Order as it comes 
at a time when there is vigorous public debate over the scope of Section 230 
and platforms’ social responsibilities in general.11 There are essentially two 
debates about Section 230 occurring simultaneously and at cross purposes: 
conservatives see liberal bias against conservative speech and seek to 
constrain service providers’ discretion in removing content, while the other 
side of the aisle sees too little action over hate speech, fake news, and other 
problematic content and seeks obligations to remove such content.12 As 
Internet law scholar Professor Eric Goldman puts it, “Section 230 is a magnet 
 
 5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 6:40 PM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1265427538140188676 [https://perma.cc/V2MF-DFBL]. 
 6 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/ [https://perma.cc/EY88-EGAK]. 
 7 For this reason, one organization has challenged the Order on First Amendment grounds. See 
Complaint at ¶¶ 9–12, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Trump, No. 20-1456 (D.D.C. June 2, 2020). 
 8 See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,080–81. 
 9 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (c)(2); Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations 
omitted) (“In light of Congress’s objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 
230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.”). 
 10 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,081. 
 11 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1652–57 (2018) (describing negative publicity over high-profile 
content moderation incidents and pressures on platforms to moderate offensive content); see also John 
Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of Social Media, 865 POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 1–2 (2019) (describing criticism of platforms’ moderation decisions). 
 12 See PAUL M. BARRETT, REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA: THE FIGHT OVER SECTION 230—AND 
BEYOND 2–3 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6df958f8370af3217d4178/t/5f4d682af95
6e403bdd2dcf5/1598908459863/NYU+Section+230_FINAL+ONLINE+UPDATED_Aug+26.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MH2J-8AJZ]. 
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for controversy, and this order pours fuel on the fire.”13 Indeed, the Order has 
spawned proposed legislation that would implement its principal proposed 
limitations on the scope of Section 230.14 
Part I of this Essay reviews the genesis of Section 230 and the immunity 
it confers. Part II then discusses the Executive Order’s proposed rules and 
analyzes whether the FCC has the authority to promulgate rules under 
Section 230, concluding that it does not. The Executive Order seeks to 
constrain websites’ discretion to remove content by requiring them to 
provide users with certain aspects of procedural due process, such as notice, 
reasoned decisions, and the opportunity to be heard.15 Yet, nothing in the 
FCC’s authorizing statute, the Communications Act of 1934,16 expressly 
grants the FCC authority to regulate Internet content, and Section 230 gives 
the FCC no role to play. While there are some additional potential sources 
of authority available, the FCC, currently led by Trump appointees, has 
closed off these avenues. 
Part III examines whether the FCC could issue the Executive Order’s 
proposed rules even if it had authority. It concludes that the FCC cannot 
because there is no ambiguity in the statute permitting the proposed 
interpretations, and, moreover, the interpretations are inconsistent with the 
text of Section 230. 
Lastly, Part IV reviews the policy implications of the proposed due 
process rules on content moderation. It concludes that instead of increasing 
free speech, the rules will have the opposite effect and will lead to more 
unwanted speech and less civil engagement online. 
 
 13 Peter Baker & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Trumpʼs Order on Social Media Could Harm One Person 
in Particular: Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05
/28/us/politics/trump-jack-dorsey.html [https://perma.cc/Y5DU-VFGK] (quoting Professor Eric 
Goldman). 
 14 On September 8, 2020, Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS), Lindsay Graham (R-SC), and Marsha 
Blackburn (R-TN) introduced a bill titled the Online Freedom and Viewpoint Diversity Act. A copy of 
the bill, unnumbered as of this date, is available at https://www.commerce.senate.gov
/services/files/94D0F3C6-B927-46D2-A75C-17C78D0D92AA [https://perma.cc/8F28-VSYK]. The bill 
adopts a number of the Executive Order’s proposals. And before the Executive Order, Senators Brian 
Schatz (D-HI) and John Thune (R-SD) introduced the also unnumbered Platform Accountability and 
Consumer Transparency Act, https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/OLL20612.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8ZNV-5KFH], which would, among other things, require service providers to give users 
the right to appeal decisions by the service providers to remove their content. 
 15 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 at 34,081. 
 16 Codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151. 
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I. SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Passed as the Cox-Wyden Amendment to the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996,17 Section 230 of the CDA18 is often cited as the most important piece 
of legislation governing the Internet as it gives websites and other online 
services freedom to make vast quantities of user content available without 
worrying that any single piece of content might be tortious or illegal.19 The 
central idea behind the statute is that websites should not be held liable for 
the decisions they make as to whether to publish or withdraw user content, 
and that they should be encouraged in their efforts to remove user content.20 
Section 230 accomplishes this by providing users and service providers with 
affirmative defenses21 to civil22 and certain criminal liability23 under state24 
and federal laws.25 
A. The Genesis of Section 230 
Section 230 was passed in response to a pair of trial court decisions in 
the mid-1990s that gave members of Congress pause.26 The first case, Cubby, 
 
 17 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230). Title V of 
the Act is called the Communications Decency Act.  
 18 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
 19 As explained by preeminent First Amendment scholar and Internet policy expert Marvin Ammori, 
Section 230 does for online publishers what New York Times Co. v. Sullivan did for print newspapers. 
Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2263–64 (2014). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held 
that First Amendment principles required that the tort of defamation be altered such that when the plaintiff 
is a public figure, the plaintiff must prove “actual malice.” 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). This gives 
speakers, including newspapers and other publishers, more freedom to report upon and criticize public 
figures. Ammori argues that Section 230 provides online services with similar breathing room. Ammori, 
supra, at 2263–64.  
 20 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that “section 230 was meant to provide immunity [such 
that] any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek 
to post online is perforce immune under section 230”). 
 21 See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 22 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (heading referring to “civil liability”).  
 23 All inconsistent state laws are expressly preempted. Id. § 230(e)(3). Federal criminal laws are 
specifically excluded from Section 230’s ambit. Id. § 230(e)(1); see also Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
No. 17-11069, 2018 WL 1542056, at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining that Section 230 “creat[es] 
immunity from civil and state criminal law, but not federal criminal law”). Following a 2018 amendment, 
Congress carved out state criminal prosecutions for sex trafficking and prostitution. See 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(5)(B)–(C).  
 24 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  
 25 For example, Section 230 applies to later-enacted federal laws. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
817 F.3d 12, 15, 23 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding that Section 230(e)(1) precluded civil liability under 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008), abrogated by statute, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(5). 
 26 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).  
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Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., concluded that CompuServe, an early online 
service, could not be held liable for defamation based upon user content 
unless it had actual notice of defamation.27 The court reasoned that 
CompuServe resembled a “distributor” under common law tort principles 
akin to a bookstore or newsstand because it did not screen user content.28 Just 
as newsstands and bookstores are not liable for selling defamatory 
newspapers and books (unless they have reason to know about the 
defamatory statements), nor should CompuServe be liable for the user’s 
defamation.29 The second case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co., involved Prodigy, a provider that screened for content unsuitable for 
children.30 Having undertaken screening efforts, the court ruled that Prodigy 
should be treated as a publisher—like a news editor—rather than a 
distributor, and thus should face liability for defamatory user content, even 
in the absence of notice or actual knowledge.31 
Congress recognized that this liability regime would, perversely, 
penalize good Samaritans like the family-friendly Prodigy.32 As Professor 
Goldman explains, Stratton Oakmont created the “moderator’s dilemma”: 
service providers must choose between aggressively removing content or 
curtailing moderation activities so that they do not put themselves on notice 
of potential illegality.33 Both options are unpalatable: the former reduces 
speech while the latter results in the proliferation of unsuitable content 
online.34 
To remove the disincentives for self-regulation, Section 230 overrules 
Stratton Oakmont, immunizing website operators with respect to certain 
 
 27 776 F. Supp. 135, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Under New York law, for example, “vendors and 
distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know of the 
defamation.” Id. at 139 (quoting Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981)). 
 28 Id. at 140–41. 
 29 This common law rule is “deeply rooted in the First Amendment” concern that if a bookseller had 
to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop, such an unreasonable burden would 
“become the public’s burden, for by restricting him the public’s access to reading matter would be 
restricted.” Id. at 139–40 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959)).  
 30 No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 31 Id. 
 32 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (describing the 
outcomes of Stratton Oakmont as “backward” in the context of Cubby, Inc.); see also FTC v. LeadClick 
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[t]he [CDA] was intended to overrule 
Stratton [Oakmont] and provide immunity for ‘interactive computer service[s]’ that make ‘good faith’ 
efforts to block and screen offensive content”). 
 33 Eric Goldman, An Overview of the United States’ Section 230 Internet Immunity, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 3 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020). 
 34 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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decisions they make concerning user-generated content.35 Under the heading 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive 
material,”36 Section 230(c) immunizes service providers from (1) actions 
undertaken as a publisher;37 and (2) good faith efforts to remove or restrict 
offensive content.38 Subject to certain exemptions (such as federal criminal 
prosecutions and intellectual property laws),39 these immunities modify other 
federal laws40 and preempt inconsistent state laws.41 It thus acts as a type of 
“super statute.”42 
Congress also took the “rather unusual step”43 of announcing its policy 
objectives in Section 230(b), which states that Congress’s objectives are to, 
inter alia, “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation;”44 “encourage the development of technologies 
[that] maximize user control” about what individuals, families, and schools 
see;45 and “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies [to] empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”46 
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 230 
Guided by Congress’s express goals, courts have established a robust 
body of law interpreting Section 230 broadly in favor of immunity for 
 
 35 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 38 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 39 Id. § 230(e)(1), (2), (4). 
 40 See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying Section 230 to civil 
claim under federal anti-terrorism law).  
 41 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
 42 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (describing the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act as a “super statute” because it “displac[es] the normal operation of other federal 
laws”).  
 43 Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2019), 
cert. denied, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2020). Legislative statements by Section 
230’s sponsors indicate that this statement of policy was intended to ward off federal regulation of Internet 
content. See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[I]t will establish 
as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal 
Government of what is on the Internet . . . .”).  
 44 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
 45 Id. § 230(b)(3). 
 46 Id. § 230(b)(4). 
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websites and other online services that host user content.47 Although the 
Supreme Court has reviewed unrelated provisions of the CDA,48 it has not 
yet reviewed a case involving Section 230.49 As such, this Essay will briefly 
review some of the key lower court decisions. 
The “typical” Section 230 case involves a situation where a service 
provider has published allegedly illegal user content.50 A smaller, but 
increasingly litigated, category involves challenges of content removal 
decisions.51 Service providers have generally been successful in suppressing 
both categories of claims based upon Section 230(c)(1), which states that 
service providers shall not be considered publishers or speakers of content 
posted by others.52 In addition to this provision, Section 230(c)(2) provides 
for immunity for service providers who voluntarily remove or restrict access 
to certain types of objectionable content,53 and thus more directly addresses 
the act of content removal.54 
1. Section 230(c)(1) 
Section 230(c)(1) states that no service provider “shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”55 No discussion of this language is complete without 
mentioning the Fourth Circuit’s 1997 decision in Zeran v. American 
Online.56 There, a defamation plaintiff asserted that Section 230 did not bar 
his claims because the service provider had notice of the defamatory user 
content.57 In his view, Congress, by using the term “publisher” in Section 
 
 47 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In light of Congress’s objectives, the 
Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor 
of immunity.”). 
 48 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 882 (1997) (striking down on First Amendment grounds anti-
indecency provisions of the Communications Decency Act, previously codified as 47 U.S.C. § 223). 
 49 Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1 
(Oct. 13, 2020) (explaining that “in the 24 years since [its passage], we have never interpreted this 
provision”) (Thomas, J., in respect of denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas recently questioned lower 
courts’ broad interpretations of Section 230, see id., and suggested that, “in an appropriate case, we should 
consider whether the text of this increasingly important statute aligns with the current state of immunity 
enjoyed by Internet platforms.” Id. 
 50 Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“In the typical case, plaintiffs 
seek to hold the interactive computer service liable for publishing the content of a third party . . . and 
immunity from liability under (c)(1) is found in that context.”). 
 51 See id. 
 52 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 53 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
 54 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 n.16 (2d Cir. 2019) (observing that Section 230(c)(2) 
“responds to Stratton [Oakmont] even more directly”). 
 55 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 56 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 57 Id. at 329, 331. 
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230(c)(1), meant only to abrogate Stratton Oakmont, while preserving the 
“distributor,” or notice-based, liability as set forth in Cubby.58 
The Fourth Circuit rejected this approach, finding that notice-based 
liability would, like Stratton Oakmont itself, “reinforce[] service providers’ 
incentives to restrict speech [or] abstain from self-regulation.”59 First, the 
court reasoned that requiring “on-the-spot editorial decision[s]” upon notice 
would not be feasible given “the sheer number of postings on interactive 
computer services.”60 And because providers would face liability only for 
content they did not remove, there would be “a natural incentive simply to 
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory 
or not,” thus chilling speech.61 Second, some providers would actively avoid 
moderation activities because “efforts by a service provider to investigate 
and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of 
potentially defamatory material more frequently and thereby create a 
stronger basis for liability.”62 
Today, federal and state courts63 agree that Section 230(c)(1) applies 
whenever three things are true: (1) the defendant provides an “interactive 
computer service;” (2) the defendant did not create the “information content” 
at issue; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims “seek[] to hold a service provider liable 
for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”64 Put 
another way, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to 
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune 
under section 230.”65 
Early Section 230 cases involved plaintiffs asserting claims of 
defamation against service providers based upon libelous user postings.66 
 
 58 Id. at 331–32. 
 59 Id. at 333. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In light of Congress’s 
objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed 
broadly in favor of immunity.”); Shiamili v. Real Est. Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1016(N.Y. 
2011) (explaining that “[b]oth state and federal courts around the country have ‘generally interpreted 
Section 230 immunity broadly’”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513 (Cal. 2006) (“These provisions 
have been widely and consistently interpreted to confer broad immunity against defamation liability for 
those who use the Internet to publish information that originated from another source.”).  
 64 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 
398, 407–09 (6th Cir. 2014) (adopting Zeran formulation); FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 
174 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying Zeran framework).  
 65 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 66 See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
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Subsequent cases have extended Section 230 beyond defamation to claims 
ranging from negligence resulting in offline harm67 to civil causes of action 
under federal anti-terrorism laws.68 
Section 230(c)(1) is not, however, without limitation. By its terms, the 
statute does not apply to content created by the website itself.69 Thus, a 
service provider’s own speech online is never immune from liability.70 Nor 
can a provider avoid liability where it contributed materially to the illegality 
of the challenged content.71 Finally, Section 230(c)(1) does not apply where 
liability stems from a website’s act that is independent of its publishing 
choices.72 
2. Section 230(c)(2) 
Section 230(c)(2) contains two parts. Section 230(c)(2)(A) states that 
no service provider shall be liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected.”73 This immunity applies when the defendant: (1) 
removed or restricted access to online materials; (2) acted in good faith; and 
(3) considered the materials to fall into one of the covered categories. 
Although this first part of this provision more directly responds to 
Stratton Oakmont and Congress’s concerns about disincentives to remove 
content,74 it has been less frequently litigated.75 And much of that litigation 
has focused on the scope of the catch-all term “otherwise objectionable.”76 
Some district courts have held that the term is not completely open-ended 
and must bear some relationship with the enumerated terms under the canon 
 
 67 See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 413 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 68 See Force, 934 F.3d at 53. 
 69 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“None of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who posts 
defamatory messages would escape accountability.”). 
 70 See id. at 330–31.  
 71 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 72 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 73 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 74 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 80 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 75 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
REFLECTION 33, 40 (2019). 
 76 See Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(observing that “[d]istrict courts nationwide have grappled with the issues” presented by this term), cert. 
denied, No. 19-1284, 2020 WL 6067214, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2020).  
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ejusdem generis,77 the principle that “when a general term follows a specific 
one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to 
the one with specific enumeration.”78 The only appellate decision on this 
score has rejected that view. In Enigma Software v. Malwarebytes, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that ejusdem generis supplied little assistance because the 
enumerated categories lacked commonality, explaining that “[m]aterial that 
is lewd or lascivious is not necessarily similar to material that is violent, or 
material that is harassing.”79 Accordingly, because the enumerated terms 
“vary greatly . . . the catchall was more likely intended to encapsulate forms 
of unwanted online content that Congress could not identify in the 1990s.”80 
The second part of this provision, 230(c)(2)(B), is an immunity that 
allows “any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material 
described in” the first paragraph (i.e., the enumerated categories and 
“otherwise objectionable” content).81 This immunity allows users and service 
providers to develop tools that allow others to restrict and remove materials, 
such as a tool that allows users to block or limit other users from commenting 
on their pages.82 
3. Application to Users 
Section 230(c)’s immunities do not just protect large social media 
platforms, they also protect “users” and any “providers” of interactive 
computer services.83 While Section 230(c)(1) certainly immunizes Twitter 
from liability for a user’s defamatory tweet, it also protects the individuals 
who retweet it.84 Thus, although President Trump may be upset about 
Twitter’s action as it relates to his mail-in-vote tweet85 (an action that is, 
 
 77 See, e.g., Song Fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Holomaxx Tech. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 78 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223 (2008) (quoting Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. 
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)). 
 79 946 F.3d at 1051. 
 80 Id. at 1051–52. 
 81 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). Technically, this provision ends with the words, “the material described in 
paragraph (1).” Id. Since there is no “paragraph (1),” this is a “typographical error,” as recognized by the 
United States Code Annotated. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2)(B) (West 2018).  
 82 Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282, 2018 WL 4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018) 
(finding that section 230(c)(2)(B) precluded a lawsuit that “charges the Facebook defendants with 
enabling users to restrict access to material”).  
 83 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (2). 
 84 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 528–29 (2006) (concluding that “user” includes a user who 
knowingly republishes a defamatory post of another). 
 85 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. Twitter’s fact-check label would not be protected by 
Section 230 because it is “information content” created or developed by Twitter itself, not of “another 
information content provider.” Id. 
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ironically, not protected by Section 230), he enjoys Section 230 protection 
anytime he retweets content that may contain defamatory statements.86 
Indeed, part of what makes Section 230 so controversial is that this immunity 
applies even where the retweeting individual does so with knowledge that 
the content is defamatory since there is no good faith requirement in Section 
230(c)(1).87 
Section 230(c)(2) also protects each user’s ability to block other users 
from reading and participating in their feeds.88 This allows people to use their 
favorite social media apps without being subjected to harassment. Twitter 
recently launched a tool that allows people to determine who may reply to 
their tweets.89 Indeed, before being ordered not to do so based upon the First 
Amendment, President Trump routinely blocked “persons expressing 
viewpoints he [found] distasteful” from his Twitter feed.90 After President 
Trump returns to the private sector, he will presumably want to resume 
blocking individuals, an action protected by Section 230(c)(2). 
4. Litigation of the Immunities in Practice 
Because the Section 230 immunities are affirmative defenses to 
liability,91 the defendant service provider bears the burden of proof.92 Still, 
Section 230 cases can be decided on motions to dismiss when the defense is 
evident from the complaint.93 Because defendants do not need to prove any 
particular state of mind or that they took any affirmative steps, the Section 
230(c)(1) immunity typically presents a question of law that can be resolved 
on a motion to dismiss,94 thus “provid[ing] . . . legal certainty at a relatively 
low cost.”95 
 
 86  Baker & Wakabayashi, supra note 13. 
 87 See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (“The prospect of blanket immunity for those who intentionally 
redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet has disturbing implications”). 
 88 For an overview of Twitter functionality in a First Amendment context, see Knight First Am. Inst. 
v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230–31 (2d Cir. 2019).  
 89 Aja Romano, Twitter Now Lets You Disable Replies. It Could Be Its Best Change Yet., VOX (May 
27, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/27/21265271/twitter-moderate-turn-off-replies-
feature [https://perma.cc/L4RJ-XTHY] (explaining that the “tool won’t completely wipe out Twitter 
harassment, but it may drastically reduce it”). 
 90 Knight First Am. Inst., 928 F.3d at 239. The court found that Trump’s Twitter feed was a public 
forum claim under the First Amendment. Id. at 238. 
 91 See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 92 See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554 U.S. 84, 91 (2008) (discussing affirmative 
defenses to find that “[w]hen a proviso . . . carves an exception out of the body of a statute or contract 
those who set up such exception must prove it”) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Javierre v. 
Cent. Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910)). 
 93 Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357.  
 94 See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63 n.15 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 95 Goldman, supra note 75, at 42.  
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Because it contains a mental element (good faith),96 Section 230(c)(2) 
may make somewhat of a less attractive case for a motion to dismiss as it 
could require discovery and even a trial where there is a genuine dispute over 
the defendant’s state of mind. For this reason, Professor Goldman suspects 
that Section 230(c)(2) imposes “higher litigation burdens [which] discourage 
defendants from relying upon it.”97 Still, Section 230(c)(2) has been applied 
on motions to dismiss98 and so it is not necessarily clear whether this is 
empirically the case.  
II.  THE FCC LACKS AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN THE PROPOSED 
RULEMAKING 
The FCC has many regulatory powers over interstate communications,99 
but the ability to regulate Internet content is not one of them. In addition, 
under the Trump Administration, the FCC has largely forsworn potential 
sources of authority that could be marshaled here. Thus, at present, it is 
unlikely that the FCC will be able to issue the Executive Order’s proposed 
rules. 
A. Proposed Rules Under the Executive Order and NTIA Petition 
Executive Order 13,925, initially drafted in August 2019,100 asserts that 
“[o]nline platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our 
national discourse” by flagging content as inappropriate, making 
unexplained policy changes, and deleting content and entire accounts 
without warning, rationale, or recourse.101 The Order identifies Section 230 
as the culprit enabling this “censorship” and argues that the statute should be 
“clarified” in several respects.102 
The Order directs the Secretary of Commerce to cause the National 
Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA) to file a petition 
for rulemaking with the FCC within 60 days103 to “expeditiously propose 
regulations to clarify” that: (1) Section 230(c)(1) does not apply to the 
 
 96 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 97 Goldman, supra note 75, at 40.  
 98 See, e.g., Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 599, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing 
case under Section 230(c)(2)).  
 99 See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (setting forth express powers of the FCC). 
 100 Margaret Harding McGill & Daniel Lippman, White House Drafting Executive Order to Tackle 
Silicon Valley’s Alleged Anti-Conservative Bias, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:07 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/07/white-house-tech-censorship-1639051 [https://perma.cc/2D
Q9-8CRP]. 
 101 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,079 (June 2, 2020). 
 102 Id. at 34,080. 
 103 Id. at 34,081. 
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removal of content; and (2) under Section 230(c)(2), “good faith” requires 
service providers to “provide adequate notice, reasoned explanation, or a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard”104 before they can remove a user’s 
content. The remainder of the Order advances other initiatives ostensibly 
aimed at eliminating “Tech Bias,” but none involve the FCC or Section 
230.105 
As required by the Executive Order, NTIA filed a petition for 
rulemaking with the FCC.106 The FCC has published the petition for 
comment,107 and on October 15, 2020, Chairman Ajit Pai stated that “I intend 
to move forward with a rulemaking to clarify [Section 230’s] meaning.”108 
While Republicans currently control the FCC 3–2, it is not clear whether 
they have three votes to commence a rulemaking proceeding—at least at 
present. Following the Executive Order’s release, Republican Commissioner 
Michael O’Rielly commented that despite harboring concerns about the 
actions of “liberal tech leaders,” “I’m extremely dedicated to [the] First 
Amendment which governs much here.”109 The Trump Administration 
interpreted this comment as opposition: In September, it withdrew 
O’Rielly’s re-nomination to the FCC and instead nominated Nathan 
Simington—a senior NTIA advisor who is said to have played a significant 
role in drafting NTIA’s petition—to fill O’Rielly’s seat once it is vacated.110 
NTIA’s petition significantly expands upon the Executive Order’s 
mandate by asking the FCC to “interpret” Section 230 in a variety of ways 
that the Order did not specifically request.111 Notwithstanding this expansion, 
this Essay addresses only the proposed rules that are directed towards 
 
 104 Id. The Order also asks for clarification as to whether an action can be “taken in good faith” if it 
is “deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of service.” Id. 
 105 Id. at 34,081–82. 
 106 Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Petition for Rulemaking, RM-11862 (July 27, 2020) 
[hereinafter NTIA Pet.].  
 107 FCC, Public Notice, Petition for Rulemakings Filed, Report No. 3157 (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-365914A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SAZ-YCWU].  
 108 FCC, Statement of Chairman Pai on Section 230 (Oct. 15, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public
/attachments/DOC-367567A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38DC-GFQ9]. 
 109 Makena Kelly, Trump Nominates Social Media Hawk as Next FCC Commissioner, VERGE (Sept. 
15, 2020, 9:38 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/15/21438820/fcc-donald-trump-nominate-
nathan-simington-commissioner-social-media-section-230-order [https://perma.cc/WHL9-BSJ4].  
 110 Id. 
 111 Most notably, NTIA’s proposed rules state that “[a]n interactive computer service is not being 
‘treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider’ 
when it actually publishes its own or third-party content.” NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 53 (proposed 
47 C.F.R. § 130.01(c)). This would likely gut Section 230(c)(1) as to “publish” content is to make it 
publicly available—which is what all platforms do. See Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 
2019) (discussing meaning of “publisher”).  
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constraining decisions to remove or restrict access to online content as that 
was the focal point of the Executive Order. 
As contemplated by the Order, NTIA’s proposed rules would preclude 
the application of Section 230(c)(1) to the act of removing or restricting user 
content, thus shunting those acts into Section 230(c)(2) alone.112 The 
proposed regulations next seek to limit Section 230(c)(2) by (1) replacing its 
subjective good faith element with one of objective reasonableness;113 (2) 
removing the “otherwise objectionable” catch-all category (thus limiting the 
provision’s applicability to the enumerated categories of offensive 
content);114 and (3) requiring a service provider to give advance notice and 
reason for removing or restricting access to user content before doing so, and 
allow the impacted user a reasonable opportunity to respond.115 On the last 
point, service providers need not provide advance notice (i.e., they may 
remove or restrict access to materials immediately) if they have a reasonable 
belief that the content is related to criminal activity or would risk imminent 
physical harm.116 
B.  FCC Rulemaking Authority Under the Communications Act  
Created by the New Deal-era Communications Act of 1934,117 the FCC 
is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by 
radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.118 The Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 updated the Communications Act for the Internet era. Where the 
Internet is concerned, the degree of regulatory authority depends on whether 
 
 112 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 53 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.01(a)) (“Section 230(c)(1) has 
no application to any interactive computer service’s decision, agreement, or action to restrict access to or 
availability of material provided by another information content provider . . . . Any applicable immunity 
for matters described in the immediately preceding sentence shall be provided solely by 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(2).”).  
 113 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.02(e)(vi)) (providing that good 
faith requires, inter alia, “an objectively reasonable belief that the material falls within one of the listed 
categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”) (emphasis added).  
 114 Id. (providing that good faith requires, inter alia, “an objectively reasonable belief that the 
material falls within one of the listed categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”) (emphasis added). 
The proposed rules would also narrowly construe the listed categories. See id. at 54–55 (proposed rule 
47 C.F.R. § 130.02(a)). 
 115 Id. at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. § 130.02(e)(viii) (requiring “timely notice describing with 
particularity the interactive computer service’s reasonable factual basis for the restriction of access and a 
meaningful opportunity to respond” subject to exceptions). 
 116 Id. (providing exceptions where “the interactive computer service has an objectively reasonable 
belief that the content is related to criminal activity or [where] notice would risk imminent physical harm 
to others”). 
 117 Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 118 See id.; see also About the FCC, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview [https://perma.cc/M8
Y8-N4D6] (agency mission statement). 
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a service is considered a “telecommunications service” (for which there is 
comprehensive authority) or an “information service” (for which there is 
relatively little authority),119 a distinction added by the 1996 Act. A 
“‘telecommunications service’ means the offering of telecommunications for 
a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.”120 
“‘[T]elecommunications’ means the transmission, between or among points 
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change 
in the form or content of the information as sent and received.”121 Basic 
landline telephone service is the archetype of a telecommunications 
service.122 When a system is properly categorized as a “telecommunications 
service,” its operator—“a telecommunications carrier”—is subject to a 
panoply of common carrier regulations123 under Title II of the 
Communications Act. A common carrier is an entity that has acquired a 
quasi-public character, from which arises the obligation to carry goods or 
services for all people indiscriminately and on reasonable terms.124 Common 
carrier regulations under Title II of Communications Act include 
interconnection requirements,125 price regulation,126 and anti-discrimination 
rules.127 
In contrast, the FCC has no comparable mandate over “information 
services,” which are services that are capable of “generating, acquiring, 
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available 
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing.”128 
Under the Communications Act, these services are “largely unregulated by 
default.”129 Further, the Act limits the FCC’s ability to regulate any entity as 
a common carrier except “to the extent that it is engaged in providing 
 
 119 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (describing history and 
development of the distinction between a “telecommunications service” and an “information service”). 
 120 47 U.S.C. § 153(53). 
 121 Id. § 153(50). 
 122 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 691 (observing that the FCC has “subjected basic [telephone] 
services . . . to common carrier treatment under Title II of the Communications Act”). 
 123 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing common carriage generally). 
 124 Id. at 651 (quoting Nat’l Assoc. of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (1976)) 
(“[T]he primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the 
undertaking to carry for all people indifferently.”). 
 125 47 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 126 Id. §§ 201(b), 202(a), 205. 
 127 Id. § 201(b). 
 128 Id. § 153(24). 
 129 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 473–74 ¶ 273 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 FCC 
Order]. 
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telecommunications services.”130 Thus, the FCC cannot set rates or prohibit 
discrimination with respect to information services.131 
Notably, websites, apps, and other online services have not yet been 
classified as either a telecommunications service or an information service. 
It is unlikely, though, that the FCC could classify Facebook or Twitter or the 
average blog as anything other than an information service.  
For one thing, an “information service” expressly includes “electronic 
publishing,”132 which describes the activity of every website. Even without 
the “electronic publishing” example, it is a heavy lift to show that a website 
could qualify as a telecommunications service. Websites do not just transmit 
data from one point to another without any change whatsoever: they receive 
and store user information, reformat that information, and present it in a web 
interface that allows other users to interact with it. Further, 
telecommunications services must be provided for “a fee directly to the 
public” or to users,133 which would make its application to advertising-based 
revenue models difficult. 
Finally, the FCC will be constrained by its own classification of Internet 
service providers (ISPs)—entities that connect users to the Internet such as 
Comcast or AT&T—as information services. In repealing the Obama era 
FCC’s “net neutrality” rules, the current FCC concluded that while ISPs are 
primarily carriers of data, they can be considered information services 
because they perform the ancillary services of domain name lookups134 and 
caching (temporarily storing files for quicker access).135 A fortiori, 
companies whose primary services involve the storage and manipulation of 
information must also be classified as information services. Accordingly, 
 
 130 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). 
 131 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650–55, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (striking down net neutrality rules 
as unlawful common carrier regulations). The Court in Verizon stated it was “obvious that the 
Commission would violate the Communications Act were it to regulate broadband providers as common 
carriers” because of the “Commission’s still-binding decision to classify broadband providers not as 
providers of ‘telecommunications services’ but instead as providers of ‘information services,’ such 
treatment would run afoul of section 153(51).” Id. at 650 (citation omitted).  
 132 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). 
 133 Id. § 153(53). 
 134 Domain Name Service (DNS) matches web page addresses that users type into their browsers 
with the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the servers hosting those pages. See Nat’l Cable & Telecom. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987 (2005). For example, DNS translates “Amazon.com” 
into “108.174.10.10,” thus making it easier for users to locate the web pages they wish to visit. In Brand 
X, the dissent likened DNS to “scarcely more than routing information, which is expressly excluded from 
the definition of ‘information service.’” Id. at 1012–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 153(20)). In reply, the majority observed that routing information was not excluded from the definition 
of “information service.” Id. at 999 n.3. 
 135 2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 325 ¶ 33; Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 32–35 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (finding FCC’s reliance on caching and DNS to justify reclassification reasonable). 
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under the overall structure of the Communications Act, the FCC lacks the 
authority to regulate websites and online applications, which are information 
services.136 
C. NTIA’s Attempt to Find Rulemaking Authority Under the Common 
Carrier Provisions of the Communications Act  
In its petition, NTIA attempts to ground rulemaking authority in the 
FCC’s general authority to make common carrier provisions under Section 
201(b) of the Communications Act.137 This presents a novel use of that 
provision as it is ostensibly limited to making common carrier regulations,138 
which, as discussed above, may only regulate telecommunications 
services—and not information services like websites. Section 201(a) of the 
Communications Act begins with the words, “[i]t shall be the duty of every 
common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or 
radio,”139 and Section 201(b) explains that “[a]ll charges, practices, 
classifications, and regulations for and in connection with such 
communication service, shall be just and reasonable.”140 After describing 
additional common carrier-specific issues, Section 201(b) concludes with the 
following sentence: “The Commission may prescribe such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter.”141 It is this sentence that NTIA relies upon to issue 
its proposed Section 230 rules. 
NTIA argues that Section 201(b) can and should be invoked to make 
rules under Section 230 because Section 230 was codified into Chapter 5 of 
Title 47 and thus falls within “this chapter” of the Act.142 That Section 230 
falls within the same chapter as Section 201(b) is certainly true, but it is less 
clear that the FCC can make regulations under Section 201(b) that have 
nothing to do with common carriers. The Supreme Court cases that NTIA 
cites143 held that Section 201(b) allows rulemaking under later-enacted 
provisions (specifically, those added by the 1996 Telecommunications Act), 
 
 136 2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 473–74 ¶ 273. 
 137 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“The Commission may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”); NTIA Pet., supra note 106, 
at 15–16.  
 138 47 U.S.C. § 201. 
 139 Id. § 201(a) (emphasis added). 
 140 Id. § 201(b) (emphasis added). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Chapter 5 of Title 47, titled “Wire or Radio Communication,” encompasses Sections 151 through 
621 of Title 47. Section 230 is found in Subchapter II, titled “Common Carriers,” which includes Section 
201 through 276. 
 143 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 16–17, 16 n.46. 
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but the regulations in those cases at least concerned common carriers.144 
Given that Section 201(b) appears to be focused on common carrier 
regulations, its rulemaking authority grant seems a poor vehicle to use for 
regulating entities that are not common carriers. And, as discussed further 
below, there is no mandate for the FCC to “carry out” Section 230. 
D. The FCC’s Lack of Rulemaking Authority Under Section 230 
Notwithstanding the arguments above, Section 230 of the CDA is an 
unlikely candidate for regulation by the FCC. Section 230 does not once 
mention the FCC: It does not give the agency express authority to make rules, 
nor does it create a scheme for the FCC to administer. Instead, the statute’s 
immunities provide a defense to litigation. 
In addition, Section 230(b)’s statements of policy are at odds with 
regulation of content-related practices. Section 230(b)(2) speaks of 
Congress’s desire to maintain the free and open market for Internet services 
“unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”145 As Representative Christopher 
Cox, one of Section 230’s co-sponsors put it, this statement of policy 
establishes that “we do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal 
Government of what is on the Internet [and] that we do not wish to have a 
Federal Computer Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the 
Internet.”146 Co-sponsor and then-Representative Ron Wyden observed that 
Congress had rejected alternative proposals involving FCC oversight, which 
he critiqued as requiring “the Federal Government spending vast sums of 
money trying to define elusive terms that are going to lead to a flood of legal 
challenges.”147 In response to NTIA’s petition, Senator Wyden and former 
Representative Cox confirmed that “[w]e and our colleagues in Congress on 
both sides of the aisle were emphatic that we were not creating new 
regulatory authority for the FCC or any other independent agency or 
executive branch department when we enacted Section 230.”148 
 
 144 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.5 (1999) (involving local competition 
provisions affecting incumbent local exchange carriers under 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252); City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 294 (2013) (involving state regulation of siting applications for personal 
wireless services, a type of common carrier, under 47 U.S.C. § 332). 
 145 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
 146 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 147 Id. (statement of Rep. Wyden). 
 148 Co-Authors of Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, Reply Comments to Petition for 
Rulemaking to Clarify Provision of Section 230, RM-11862, at 4 (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10917190303687/2020-09-17%20Cox-Wyden%20FCC%20Reply%20
Comments%20Final%20as%20Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW6C-S5TB]. 
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Consistent with these views, the FCC has found that Section 230(b) sets 
forth a “deregulatory policy”149 and cited it when determining not to classify 
ISPs as telecommunications carriers and impose common carrier regulations 
upon them.150 It would be ironic if the FCC then held that it somehow retained 
the right to impose content removal regulations on websites, users, and ISPs 
under Section 230(c). 
Finally, any interpretation of Section 230 by the FCC would be an 
exercise in futility because the FCC cannot actually enforce Section 230’s 
immunities. Because Section 230 is a litigation defense, its arbiters are the 
courts. While courts typically defer to agencies in the interpretation of their 
governing statutes,151 they may not be so willing to do so here where the FCC 
does not administer Section 230 and has no agency expertise or experience 
adjudicating Section 230 cases.152 In addition, as explained in Part III, the 
proposed rules are fundamentally inconsistent with Section 230. 
III. THE PROPOSED RULES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 230 
Rulemaking authority is vested in agencies to fill in the gaps left by 
Congress in a statute.153 Rulemaking cannot, however, be used to alter an 
unambiguous statute.154 Even where ambiguity exists, an agency cannot 
promulgate rules that unreasonably interpret the ambiguity155 or contravene 
the text of the statute.156 Here, even assuming the FCC had proper authority, 
the proposed changes would amend Section 230 without Congress’s consent. 
A. The Proposed Limitation of Section 230(c)(1) 
The Executive Order would have the FCC “clarify” that Section 
230(c)(2)’s “good faith” requirement exclusively covers content removal 
decisions. The problem, as the White House sees it, is that if Section 
230(c)(1) also applies to content removals, then a service provider can 
 
 149 2018 FCC Order, supra note 129, at 349–50 ¶ 61. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (explaining 
that where a “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”); City of Arlington v. 
FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2013) (holding that Chevron applies to both jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional matters). 
 152 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (explaining that no deference is owed to IRS, 
“which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–69 
(2006) (finding no deference owed to DOJ where it lacked authority to issue interpretation).  
 153 See Nat’l Cable & Telecom. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
 154 See id. at 986. 
 155 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1 (2012) (“It does not 
matter whether the word ‘yellow’ is ambiguous when the agency has interpreted it to mean ‘purple.’”). 
 156 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 634–35, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
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remove content for any reason—whether or not taken in “good faith.”157 If 
true, then a service provider’s ability to remove content is not constrained. 
The Executive Order argues that this renders Section 230(c)(2) useless, and 
that the canon against surplusage interpretations counsels an interpretation 
that gives both provisions meaning.158 Accordingly, the Order argues that 
Section 230(c)(1) should be limited to immunizing the act of making content 
public, but not the act of removing or restricting access to content.159 
The trouble with this surplusage argument is that it is not true. 
Interpreting Section 230(c)(1) to apply to the decision to remove content 
does not negate Section 230(c)(2). Instead, the latter “still has work to do.”160 
First, Section 230(c)(1) applies only to publishing decisions made regarding 
“information provided by another information content provider”—in other 
words, third-party content.161 By its terms, this provision would not 
immunize a website provider’s removal or restriction of its own content. In 
contrast, Section 230(c)(2) would cover removal of the provider’s own 
content as well as third party content, as it applies to any “materials” 
regardless of the author.162 This immunity could come into play if a website 
had decided to restrict portions of its content to some users, but not others 
based upon, for example, the age of the users in question.163 
Second, because Section 230(c)(1) requires that the defendant be 
treated as the “publisher,” it does not apply where the service provider has 
stepped outside of the traditional publisher role.164 For example, in Barnes v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that a promise to remove content could 
support a promissory estoppel claim that was not barred by Section 230(c)(1) 
because it did not implicate the website’s duties as a publisher.165 Thus, 
where a website makes an express promise regarding user content that is 
collateral to its publisher role, Section 230(c)(1) might not apply; however, 
 
 157 See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 158 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,081 (June 2, 2020). 
 159 Id.; see also e-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646, 2017 WL 2210029, 
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017). 
 160 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969, 971 (2019) (in different statutory context, declining to apply 
canon regarding surplusage interpretations). 
 161 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 162 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 163 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 563, 582 n.14 (2002) (recognizing existence of “adult 
identification screens” to verify age of users); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 252 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “technological mechanisms exist to create adult zones by using 
credit cards, passwords, PIN identification, adult verification services, and website self-identification 
methods”). 
 164 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 165 Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102, 1109. 
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Section 230(c)(2) could still apply if the underlying action is to remove 
content. 
Third, Section 230(c)(2) actually contains two subparts. The second 
subpart, paragraph (B), is not impacted by construing Section 230(c)(1) to 
include or exclude content removal. Section 230(c)(2)(B) allows entities to 
create and distribute tools that allow users and service providers to restrict 
access to content as permitted by paragraph (A).166 Thus, Facebook or Twitter 
may, without liability, enable users to block other people, and other 
companies may create software that allows people to filter the content that 
they view.167 The right in Section 230(c)(2)(B) incorporates by reference the 
definitional elements of Section 230(c)(2)(A) and has no parallel in Section 
230(c)(1).168 
Considering all of the ways that Section 230(c)(2) may apply where 
Section 230(c)(1) may not, the judicial preference of avoiding surplusage 
interpretations does not apply.169 
B. The Proposed Restriction of Section 230(c)(2) 
NTIA’s petition restricts Section 230(c)(2) to the expressly enumerated 
categories of content and then defines those categories narrowly.170 In doing 
so, the petition reads the term “otherwise objectionable” out of the statute.171 
NTIA relies on the statutory interpretation canon esjudem generis172 to 
interpret that term but ends up actually eliminating it entirely.173 This is not 
a reasonable construction since it fails to give meaning to the words 
“otherwise objectionable,” thus committing the sin of surplusage 
interpretations that the petition rails about elsewhere.174 In addition, as 
discussed above, the force of esjudem generis is blunted where the 
enumerated terms speak to vastly different matters, as is the case in the types 
of material described in Section 230(c)(2)(A).175 
 
 166 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B). 
 167 See Fehrenbach v. Zeldin, No. 17-CV-5282, 2018 WL 4242452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018) 
(dismissing claim that Facebook facilitated content removal by others). 
 168 Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), with id. § 230(c)(2)(B).  
 169 See Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 969 (2019) (rejecting application of canon against 
surplusage where statute “still has work to do”). 
 170 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 54–55 (proposed rules 47 C.F.R. §§ 130.02, 130.03). 
 171 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
 172 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 31–32. 
 173 Id. at 54 (proposed rule 47 U.S.C. § 130.02(e)(vi)) (requiring “objectively reasonable belief that 
the material falls within one of the listed categories set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)”). 
 174 See id. at 28–29. 
 175 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (enumerating “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material). 
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C. The Proposed Introduction of an Objective Standard 
As written, Section 230(c)(2) protects a service provider that acts in 
“good faith” to remove content that it “considers to be . . . objectionable.”176 
This speaks to a purely subjective good faith standard.177 Despite this, NTIA 
proposes to change the mental state to one of reasonableness. But because 
terms like “good faith” and “reasonableness” have well-settled meanings 
under the common law, it is presumed that, unless Congress specifically 
provides otherwise, statutes should be interpreted with those standards in 
mind.178 Since Congress did not provide a non-standard definition of “good 
faith” (or any definition for that matter), it must be assumed that the term 
retains its ordinary common law meaning. 
To that end, “courts interpreting other federal statutes have traditionally 
interpreted ‘good faith’ to encompass a subjective standard.”179 As such, “the 
objective reasonableness standard is distinct from the subjective good faith 
standard, and . . . Congress understands this distinction.”180 Because the two 
standards are mutually exclusive,181 swapping one for the other would be akin 
to rewriting the statute. 
D. The Proposed Due Process Requirements 
The Executive Order proposes that immunity should not apply to those 
service providers who, in removing content, “fail[] to provide adequate 
notice, reasoned explanation, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”182 
NTIA’s petition recasts this burden by requiring service providers to (1) 
furnish “timely notice” (2) “describ[e] with particularity the interactive 
computer service’s reasonable factual basis for the restriction of access,” and 
(3) provide users with “a meaningful opportunity to respond.”183 Advance 
notice is not required, however, if “the interactive computer service has an 
objectively reasonable belief that the content is related to criminal activity or 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (focusing on Vimeo’s 
“subjective” good faith). 
 178 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“It is a well-established rule of construction that 
where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the common law, a court must 
infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning 
of these terms.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 179 Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s reference to “good faith belief” referred to subjective good faith). 
 180 Id. 
 181 See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 925 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“These two 
standards—one subjective and the other objective—cannot co-exist.”).  
 182 Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079, 34,081 (June 2, 2020).  
 183 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. 130.02(e)(viii)). 
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such notice would risk imminent physical harm to others.”184 It is difficult to 
see how these procedural rules can be fashioned from thread as bare as “good 
faith,” especially given Congress’s policy goals in enacting Section 230.185 
As explained above, “good faith” is a subjective mental element. And, as 
Professor David Pozen observes, “[c]lassic formulations of legal bad faith 
look to the actor’s state of mind and, above all, to her honesty and 
sincerity.”186 It does not, however, require procedural due process.187 
Moreover, the statute is quite clear in what it requires of service 
providers—and that is very little. The only affirmative obligation in the 
entire statute is Section 230(d)’s unenforceable requirement that service 
providers inform users that filtering technologies are available.188 The 
existence of this singular obligation indicates that Congress knew how to 
impose affirmative obligations on service providers, but declined to do so 
when it came to content moderation.189 Consistent with this view, the 
immunity applies “even when self-regulation is unsuccessful, or completely 
unattempted.”190 
In addition to these statutory interpretation hurdles, the notice 
requirements create another concern that bears mentioning in brief. 
Specifically, they raise the specter of compelled speech in violation of the 
First Amendment. By requiring service providers to provide notice and to 
articulate reasons for a proposed removal of content—as well the 
requirement that they continue hosting objectionable content for a period 
after notice has been delivered—the rules may very well abridge the First 
Amendment right not to speak.191 
 
 184 Id. 
 185 See discussion infra Section IV. 
 186 David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 892 (2016). 
 187 For example, many judicial and governmental bodies make decisions every day without providing 
reasons. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) (providing examples 
including the Supreme Court denying certiorari, appellate judges ruling from the bench, and trial judges 
overruling objections). 
 188 47 U.S.C. § 230(d). Congress did not provide in the statute a remedy for violation thereof. Id. 
 189 Here, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to say one thing is to exclude another) 
comes into play. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) (holding that Congress’s 
decision to include hardship exemptions in a statute indicated the lack of additional non-hardship-based 
exemptions). 
 190 See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 523 (Cal. 2006) (discussing lack of obligations under 
Section 230(c)(1)); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
“Section 230(c)(2) does not require AOL to restrict speech; rather it allows AOL to establish standards 
of decency without risking liability for doing so”). 
 191 A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a general discussion of the 
First Amendment right against compelled speech, see Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right 
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 977–80 (2009). Certain commenters in the FCC 
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IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
While some believe that voluntary measures by large social media 
platforms to enhance content moderation transparency and provide recourse 
mechanisms are welcome,192 the Section 230 immunities should not be 
conditioned upon providing such measures. Congress explicitly endorsed 
this policy choice in enacting Section 230.193 Indeed, one court concluded 
that requiring a service provider to discuss its reasons for removing content 
would be inconsistent with these goals.194 Congress usually does not “hide 
elephants in mouseholes,”195 and so it would be surprising if Congress sought 
to undermine its own goals through an idiosyncratic conception of “good 
faith.” 
Moreover, moderating content is a complex endeavor, particularly for 
companies that are operating at scale, and prescriptive content moderation 
rules would likely cause unintended harms, such as increasing moderation 
challenges, enabling more harmful speech online, and rendering the 
immunity provided by Section 230(c)(2) essentially nonexistent. 
A. Increased Moderation Challenges 
Requiring advance notice or individualized reasons for content removal 
will make moderation efforts less effective and more costly. First, these 
duties cannot fully be performed by automated technologies, which major 
platforms use, in conjunction with human review, to address the sheer 
volume of content posted by users.196 Automated techniques include using 
 
proceeding have raised the point about compelled speech. See, e.g., TechFreedom, Comments on Petition 
for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230, RM-11862, at 71–73 (Sept. 2, 2020), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10903920204512/NTIA%20230%20Petition%20Comments%20-
%209.2.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y72Z-HVCQ]; Professors Christopher Terry and Daniel Lyons, 
Reply Comments on Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230, RM-11862, at 3–4 
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/109101724016162/2020%20Terry%20and%20Lyons
%20Sec%20230%20Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX3F-KUCM]. 
 192 For example, the Santa Clara Principles on user content set forth voluntary principles for content 
moderation transparency and recourse. See THE SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES ON TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTENT MODERATION, https://santaclaraprinciples.org/ [https://perma.cc/6K3Y-
QMEQ]. 
 193 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Holomaxx Tech. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding 
that imposing “a duty [on Microsoft] to discuss in detail its reasons for blocking Holomaxx’s 
communications or to provide a remedy for such blocking . . . would be inconsistent with the intent of 
Congress”). 
 195 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 196 Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing Facebook’s efforts to combat 
extremist content on its platform through the combination of internal procedures, user reports, and 
experimental artificial intelligence). 
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keywords to block or identify content,197 filtering suspect IP addresses,198 
detecting suspicious activity traffic patterns,199 fingerprinting media files and 
comparing them to reference databases, and hash-blocking files.200 These 
tools are particularly useful when combatting problems of scale like spam 
and inauthentic content, which can be automated by bad actors. If these tools 
cannot be used, spam and inauthentic content will proliferate. 
Platforms could try to compensate by increasing the size of their human 
review teams, but this comes with additional costs and challenges. As 
Professor Tim Wu has observed, software-based solutions enjoy an 
“undeniable comparative advantage” over human employees when it comes 
to “scale, speed, and efficacy.”201 Human review is particularly ill-suited to 
problems caused by automated software like scripts or bots—the tools of 
choice for spammers, hackers, and other bad actors.202 While human review 
is an acceptable (and perhaps even the preferred203) method for reviewing 
 
 197 See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing 
keyword-based tools), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 198 See Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040–41 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (describing use of IP addresses to combat spam). 
 199 See Kurt Wagner, Facebook Found a New Way to Identify Spam and False News Articles in Your 
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feed-algorithm-update-spam [https://perma.cc/5FN5-QW6L] (explaining that Facebook algorithms 
determine fake news in part by examining links shared by persons posting content more than fifty times 
per day). 
 200 Klonick, supra note 11, at 1636–37 (describing “ex ante,” i.e., pre-publication, automated 
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 201 Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence Eat the Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (2019) (“Code is fast, can scale to meet the size of the problem, and 
operates at low marginal cost.”). 
 202 What is a Spam Bot? How Spam Comments and Spam Messages Spread, CLOUDFLARE, 
https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/what-is-a-spambot/#:~:text=%7C%20How%20Spam%20
Comments%20and%20Spam,operate%20stolen%20social%20media%20accounts [https://perma.cc/6D
B2-53W3]; see also Recent Development, Splog! Or How to Stop the Rise of a New Menace on the 
Internet, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467, 469–70, 476 (2006) (describing the proliferation of link and 
comment spam caused by automated software and calling for regulation of the use of scripts, bots, and 
other programs to quickly post multiple messages on these sites).  
 203 Automated technologies may be more efficient, but they may miss nuances and may lead to either 
(or both) an over-removal of lawful content (false positives) or an under-removal of illicit content (false 
negatives). See Michal Lavi, Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 499–500 (2020) 
(“[T]hus far, technological suggestions for moderation of terrorist content have been rejected. There is 
concern that algorithms will fail to capture context accurately, resulting in both over-removal of content 
that is not incitement . . . and under-removal of inciting content that would allow harmful content to 
spread.”). In addition, “data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply both obstacles to accountability and 
opportunities for cooptation of accountability structures.” Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the 
Practical Inevitability of the Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 95 (2019). As a result of these 
drawbacks, “[h]uman resources remain vitally important to when and how the major platforms publicly 
distribute user-generated content.” Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
F. 252, 260 (2019).  
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certain types of content on an individualized basis, it is not well suited to 
situations where a bad actor is flooding a site with thousands of posts in a 
very short time period. This scenario presents a problem of scale that is best 
addressed by technical solutions to, among other things, detect and block 
suspicious traffic patterns.204 In addition, not every platform has the resources 
to hire a team of thousands. 
At the same time, human review productivity will likely decrease as 
reviewers would be forced to provide detailed reasons when removing 
content. At present, most sites provide only the nature of the violation (e.g., 
“pornography”). Such a response would, presumably, not suffice under the 
proposed rules, where the service provider must issue a written notice 
“describing with particularity” the “factual basis” for its decision.205 Taking 
the time to, for example, watch the entirety of a video, and then detail the 
reasons for removal (e.g., “At time index 2:30, the individuals in the video 
participate in a sexual act, to wit . . . .”) will almost certainly slow down 
content removals and limit the number of removals that each human reviewer 
can accomplish within a workday.206 
Furthermore, platforms that rely on volunteer moderators to achieve 
scale will suffer. Section 230 currently protects every volunteer moderator 
of a forum when they remove content. At present, individual employees who 
make decisions about user content are covered by Section 230 since they 
themselves are “users” of interactive computer services.207 If the Order’s 
suggested rules apply, however, unpaid volunteers who serve as moderators 
of interest-based forums208 could be exposed to personal liability. This makes 
 
 204 Jonathan I. Ezor, Busting Blocks: Revisiting 47 U.S.C. § 230 to Address the Lack of Effective 
Legal Recourse for Wrongful Inclusion in Spam Filters, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–18 (2011) 
(describing technologies including block lists and filters for addressing email spam).  
 205 NTIA Pet., supra note 106, at 55 (proposed rule 47 C.F.R. 130.02(e)(viii)). 
 206 There is also a cost exacted on the human reviewers. In May 2020, Facebook agreed to provide a 
settlement fund of $52 million to former content moderators who suffered post-traumatic stress disorder 
as a result of their work reviewing graphic and objectionable content in connection with a putative class 
action lawsuit. See SCOLA V. FACEBOOK PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, https://contentmoderator
settlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/6BU3-W3J4] (official settlement website for Scola v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. 18-civ-05135 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2019)). Final approval of the settlement is pending.  
 207 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (c)(2)(A); see also, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he language of § 230(c)(1) confers immunity not just on ‘providers’ of such services, but 
also on ‘users’ of such services.”). 
 208 See J. Nathan Matias, What Just Happened on Reddit? Understanding the Moderator Blackout, 
SOC. MEDIA COLLECTIVE (July 13, 2015), https://socialmediacollective.org/2015/07/09/what-just-
happened-on-reddit-understanding-the-moderator-blackout/ [https://perma.cc/XS77-BZQT] (estimating 
that nearly 100,000 people volunteer as moderators of online communities on Reddit known as 
“subreddits”). 
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a difficult and uncompensated job209 even less attractive. Without a willing 
pool of moderators, websites will have to choose between devoting more 
resources to content moderation or deciding to forego content moderation 
altogether. 
Faced with increased costs, some companies will decide that the 
benefits of hosting user feedback are outweighed by the cost of having to 
moderate it and will opt to shut it down. This will be particularly true where 
user content is an ancillary feature of a company’s website. For example, 
local newspapers, already struggling to stay in business, might cut off “below 
the line” comments sections on their stories.210 Similarly, online retailers and 
aggregators may stop allowing user reviews.211 
Well-funded social media platforms will likely invest in more people, 
but new entrants do not have this luxury.212 And given that there is little 
evidence that consumers want less moderation in their social media 
platforms, startups will suffer to gain traction.213 Social media as a sector 
could therefore become less attractive to investment.214 This will reduce 
competition, thus entrenching the very “titans” the Executive Order 
decries.215 
B. More Harmful Speech Online 
Under the Executive Order and NTIA’s proposed regulations, the 
immunity for content removal would be limited to the categories of harmful 
content expressly enumerated in the statute. This means that service 
providers will only be protected from civil liability when they remove (1) 
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pornography and other adult-related materials, (2) excessively violent 
content, and (3) harassing speech. This leaves a world of harmful content 
online: Hate speech, fake news, and even defamation—which animated 
Section 230—would no longer be covered. Without protections, some 
companies may choose not to expand categories of prohibited content or to 
vigorously enforce unprotected categories. This risks a proliferation of 
harmful content on Internet platforms. 
Hate speech presents a particular problem and is a glaring (and perhaps 
telling) omission from the Executive Order and NTIA’s petition. The very 
purpose and effect of hate speech is to diminish speech and public 
participation by targeted groups.216 As Steve Huffman, Reddit’s CEO and 
Co-Founder, recently stated, “[t]here’s certain speech—for example, 
harassment and hate—that prevents other people from speaking.”217 Notably, 
one Trump-appointed judge echoed Huffman’s concern in voting to allow 
President Trump to block users in his Twitter feed because having a forum 
“overrun with harassment, trolling, and hate speech” will lead to less speech, 
not more.218 
Misinformation, another category noticeably left unprotected, would 
also likely proliferate. As with hate speech, misinformation can cause real 
world harms. Incorrect medical advice can be fatal, while voting 
misinformation can undermine democracy. The reply that “more speech” is 
the best way to counteract these harms is unsatisfactory. Content like fake 
news propagates far more rapidly and widely than truthful information and 
is thus impervious to counterspeech.219 
And even where Section 230(c)(2) would continue to apply, the 
proposed rules would require service providers to keep certain types of 
content online until the posting user has a reasonable opportunity to respond, 
thus further increasing the moderation challenges described above. While the 
rules provide an exception for cases where the provider reasonably believes 
that the content violates criminal law, this would not address many common 
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types of harmful content.220 Take pornography for example. In the United 
States, content depicting sexual acts—i.e., pornography—is legal. As a 
result, to earn protection under Section 230(c)(2), service providers would 
have to give posting users notice and an opportunity to respond before they 
could remove or even restrict access to pornographic content. In the 
meantime, the provider will be displaying this content to an audience that 
may include children. 
 Perhaps even worse than pornography are forms of harassment. While 
extreme cases of harassment can be illegal, mere acts of trolling and insults 
are not. Such toxic content harms the civil discourse by making people less 
likely to participate in the first place. What is more, “the burdens of dealing 
with the production of incendiary speech in social media are not borne 
equally: such speech appears to disproportionately target women and people 
of color, especially those who use social media platforms to speak up against 
perceived injustice.”221 By delaying the removal of harassing content, the 
Order allows harassers to win. 
C. An Illusory Immunity 
As a practical matter, even where Section 230(c)(2) applies, if the 
Executive Order were to have full sway, the degree of immunity provided 
would be minimal, at best. Whereas the assertion of today’s version requires 
only a showing of subjective good faith, the President’s version requires that 
a defendant satisfy a whole panoply of affirmative requirements.222 The 
existence of so many requirements makes it unlikely that the affirmative 
defense could be won on a motion to dismiss. For example, imagine a case 
where a plaintiff sues, claiming that the defendant has wrongfully removed 
his videos. He is not obligated to anticipate Section 230 and provide facts 
relating to the service provider’s actions,223 so he merely alleges that the 
service provider has acted wrongfully. In most courts, the defendant likely 
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will not be able to, in an early motion, introduce facts showing that it 
provided notice and reasons.224 The case must then proceed to discovery, 
which can be costly, and a trial, unless the court grants summary judgment. 
All of this changes the cost equation for the service provider. No longer does 
Section 230 provide an immunity at relatively low cost; instead, it provides 
an immunity that can only be achieved after substantial (and costly) 
litigation. Faced with the prospect of costly litigation, service providers may 
well take the path of least resistance: decline to remove content in close cases 
or cases where the user strenuously objects and threats a lawsuit. The result 
is more harmful speech online. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the White House’s belief, the FCC cannot modify Section 
230 in the guise of interpreting it. The FCC lacks broad authority to regulate 
the Internet and has closed off possible avenues of regulatory authority in the 
net neutrality proceedings. In addition, the rules proposed by the Executive 
Order are inconsistent with Section 230’s plain text and purpose. Finally, the 
Order’s proposed rules requiring due process would create uncertainty where 
none exists now, make hosting user speech more costly, and burden efforts 
to remove harmful content. This will lead to less beneficial speech, not more. 
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